by Muhammad Nadeem
SRINAGAR: Henry Alfred Kissinger, a name that evokes both admiration and disdain, has had a life marked by three distinct acts. Born on May 27, 1923, in Fürth, Germany, Kissinger’s journey traverses academia, government service, and a lucrative third act in New York City, leaving an indelible mark on global politics. He passed away on November 29, 2023.
Kissinger’s initial foray into academia set the stage for his later geopolitical endeavours. After escaping Nazi Germany with his family in 1938, he arrived in New York City at 615 Fort Washington Avenue. Despite initial struggles, he attended George Washington High School and later City College of New York. Drafted in 1943, he became an American citizen and served in Europe, earning a Bronze Star. Post-war, he continued his education at Harvard, eventually obtaining a PhD in 1954.
Kissinger rose to prominence as a key figure in US foreign policy. His association with Nelson Rockefeller and subsequent recruitment by Richard Nixon in the tumultuous era of Watergate marked a pivotal turning point. Serving as national security adviser from 1969 to 1975 and secretary of state from 1973 to 1977, Kissinger became an architect of the United States’ global dominance during the Cold War. His 1973 Nobel Peace Prize for ending the Vietnam War stirred controversy, and critics faulted his involvement in destabilising foreign governments.
However, his legacy is contentious. The bombing of Cambodia, the carpet-bombing of Vietnam, and the abandonment of the Kurds stain his record. His involvement in Chile led to the rise of Pinochet’s regime, causing mass casualties. The invasion of East Timor and his association with authoritarian leaders further marred his reputation.
Kissinger’s life unfolded in New York City, post his government service. In 1977, at the age of 53, he faced financial challenges but rebounded by signing a lucrative book contract and engaging in consultancy work. His empire expanded to include roles on boards such as Twentieth Century Fox and CBS, advising Disney on China, and contributing to financial institutions like Goldman Sachs and Chase Manhattan.
The controversy surrounding Kissinger would never dissipate. Manifestations of his past, including his war crimes, continued to haunt him. Journalists confronted him at dinner parties, questioning his role in global conflicts. Despite occasional criticisms, New York City’s elite continued to embrace him. Kissinger’s influence endured through the years, with connections to subsequent administrations and engagements with major corporations.
His consultancy firm, Kissinger Associates, founded in 1982, capitalised on his international reputation. Post-government service, Kissinger remained active, engaging in White House meetings, authoring leadership books, and testifying on nuclear threats. His diplomatic legacy is one of both cleverness and criticism, shaping a complex narrative in US history.
The long and controversial journey of Henry Kissinger continues to spark debate and reflection on the complexities of global politics as passed away at the age of 100 at his Connecticut home.
Kissinger and Kashmir
One American statesman whose legacy is closely associated with major events in South Asia in the 1970s is Henry Kissinger. As National Security Advisor and later Secretary of State under President Richard Nixon, Kissinger was instrumental in shaping US foreign policy during a crucial transitional period in the subcontinent’s history. His strategic overtures and policy positions related to India, Pakistan, and the war for Bangladeshi independence greatly impacted regional affairs. Kissinger has also periodically commented on Kashmir over the subsequent decades.
Examining his record reveals a nuanced and evolving perspective on this conflict and American interests. Kissinger’s South Asia policy in the lead-up to the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War was mainly focused on maintaining influence with the Pakistani government and limiting perceived Soviet inroads. This led the Nixon administration towards a controversial “tilt” favouring Pakistan as the crisis with an increasingly estranged East Pakistan grew. India had also signed a landmark friendship treaty with the Soviet Union in August 1971.
While India stressed humanitarian concerns behind its eventual military intervention in East Pakistan, Kissinger accused Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of opportunism by attacking West Pakistan. In the declassified Oval Office recordings, he called Gandhi a “bitch”, and Nixon labelled her a “witch” – indicating their hostile mindsets. At the same time, however, Kissinger admired Gandhi as a leading non-aligned figure. His dicey relationship with India can be partly attributed to its position as a rival pole for influence against both superpowers’ agendas.
On Kashmir specifically, American policy in the early 1970s remained consistent with previous decades in considering the dispute as directly between India and Pakistan. Neither Nixon nor Kissinger attempted to actively mediate or propose substantive solutions. The territorial integrity of Pakistan, though split into two, was still deemed critical in containing Soviet ambitions. But post-war, Pakistan’s defeat did force recognition that India was the preeminent power in South Asia and required constructive bilateral ties.
1974 Onwards
Kissinger travelled to India in October 1974 on a visit aimed at mending relations. By then he had become Secretary of State, and nuclear issues were rising in prominence. In a speech, he called for restraint between both countries on Kashmir and respected it as an extremely complex legacy of history. This marked a shift from outright avoidance to acknowledgement that the US potentially had a supportive diplomatic role, though strictly bilateral talks between India and Pakistan were still advocated as the best path forward.
Over subsequent decades, as militancy erupted in Kashmir in the late 1980s, Kissinger, as an elder statesman and policy intellectual, warned American leaders against getting directly embroiled as a partisan mediator.
In his 2002 article in The Washington Post, Kissinger states that “The Kashmir issue is one of the residues of the settlements of the period immediately following World War II.”
He argued that “In the half-century since the issue of Kashmir has become embedded in the fabric of how the two nations justify their existence. For Pakistan, Kashmir symbolizes its claim to governing those parts of the Indian subcontinent where Muslims are in a majority.” Furthermore, “For India — which has a larger Muslim population than Pakistan — the future of Kashmir is a test of its national cohesion.”
Finally, Kissinger states “No wonder there have been three wars over the future of Kashmir. And inevitably, the issue of Kashmir has proved unsuitable for mediation; there is no compromise foreseeable between the clashing passions.” His view is that Kashmir cannot be easily resolved.
Nuances arose in Kissinger’s post-Cold War views regarding Islamist militancy and nuclear proliferation in the region too. He empathised more with India’s security predicament, stating Pakistan needed to curb cross-border terrorism. But he continued opposing sanctions or coercive techniques against either nation, sticking to a realist vision of stability through cooperation. Ongoing American efforts to manage tensions and spur crisis dialogues fitted this template.
An Unpredictable Broker
As National Security Advisor, he prioritised stability favourable to global superpower politics rather than pursuing mediation. He also made ‘regrettable’ private statements indicative of an older era’s prejudices against newly decolonised nations like India. However, Kissinger quickly helped rebuild ties recognising India’s vital position after the 1971-72 war.
While later urging self-restraint and trust in indigenous diplomatic solutions to unlock the Kashmir paralysis, he remained open to America facilitating backchannel talks when progress opportunities arose. But Kissinger was always cognizant of historical complexities outsiders often struggle to grasp. He can be classified as a realist sceptical of Washington’s capacity to be a predictable broker, yet acknowledging vital stakes in preventing catastrophic escalation between two nuclear-armed foes. His unusual vantage point bridging the late Cold War into the 21st century adds insightful nuance around interests, incentives and influence critical to making sense of intractable conflicts.
