SRINAGAR: The High Court of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh has refused to grant an eviction decree against a Jammu shopkeeper merely on the basis of the tenant’s admission of receiving a termination notice, holding that receipt of a notice and admission of its legal validity are two different things.
Justice Moksha Khajuria Kazmi dismissed a civil revision petition filed by Madhu Suri, challenging the trial court’s refusal to decree an eviction suit under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). The court held that the tenant had raised substantive factual defences which required adjudication through evidence and could not be brushed aside at the stage of deciding an application for judgment on admissions.
“The mere fact that the respondent has acknowledged receipt of the notice cannot, by itself, be treated as an admission that the tenancy stood validly and lawfully terminated in terms of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act,” the court observed.
The judgment was pronounced on September 3, 2026, in Civil Revision No. 17/2025, which challenged the May 31, 2025 order of the Sub-Judge, Jammu, in a civil suit titled Suman Kumar v. M/s Ch. Aishi Ram Batra and Sons.
The original suit was filed by Suman Kumar, husband of the petitioner, seeking ejectment of M/s Ch. Aishi Ram Batra & Sons from a shop on Exchange Road, Jammu. The plaintiff had claimed that the premises were required to start a business in association with his unemployed son and that his personal requirement was greater than that of the respondent.
The plaintiff had also alleged that the respondent was not carrying out any business activity from the shop. A notice dated May 11, 2017, was served upon the respondent, asking it to hand over vacant possession within 30 days. The respondent replied to the notice but did not vacate the premises, following which the ejectment suit was instituted.
The respondent contested the suit, asserting that the premises were licensed and were being used for wholesale kerosene dealership under a licence granted by the Department of Consumer Affairs and Public Distribution. It therefore disputed the allegation that no business activity was being carried out from the shop.
The respondent also questioned the plaintiff’s claim of personal necessity, pointing out that his son was pursuing studies and had no immediate requirement of the premises to start a business. It further claimed that its own requirement of the premises was greater and more pressing.
During the proceedings, the petitioner sought a decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, arguing that the respondent had admitted the landlord-tenant relationship and receipt of the notice issued under the Transfer of Property Act. According to the petitioner, these admissions were sufficient to bring the suit to an end without a full-fledged trial.
The application was opposed by the respondent, which maintained that mere receipt of the notice did not amount to an admission of its validity or of all the pleadings. It also disputed the validity and effect of the notice as well as the grounds relied upon for eviction.
The trial court rejected the application after considering the pleadings and relevant legal provisions, relying, among other judgments, on Supreme Court decisions in Karan Kapoor v. Madhuri Kumar, S.M. Asif v. Virendar Kumar Bajaj and Bhuvneshwar Prasad v. United Commercial Bank.
Before the High Court, advocate Sudesh Sharma, appearing for the petitioner, argued that in an eviction suit under the Transfer of Property Act, the landlord was required to establish the existence of the tenancy and termination of the tenancy through a notice under Section 106 of the Act. Since both facts had been admitted, counsel argued that an eviction decree should have followed under Order XII Rule 6 CPC.
Counsel relied upon the Supreme Court judgment in M/s Payal Vision Ltd. v. Radhika Choudhary, submitting that the essential requirements were the existence of the landlord-tenant relationship and termination of the tenancy.
Advocate Rahul Raina, appearing for the respondent, opposed the plea, arguing that the alleged admissions were neither categorical nor unequivocal. He submitted that the case involved substantial disputed questions of fact which required adjudication after the parties led evidence.
The High Court agreed with the respondent’s position, holding that Order XII Rule 6 CPC could not be invoked merely by pointing to an isolated admission in the pleadings.
“The power is discretionary and is to be exercised only where the admission is clear, unambiguous, unequivocal and unconditional,” the court said, adding that a party cannot claim a decree under the provision as a matter of right merely by pointing out some admission in the pleadings.
The court noted that the respondent had not limited its defence to a bare denial. It had specifically disputed the nature and use of the premises, asserted that it was conducting a licensed wholesale kerosene dealership there and challenged the plaintiff’s claim regarding non-use of the shop.
It had also disputed the plaintiff’s alleged requirement of the premises and asserted its own requirement.
“Receipt of a notice and admission of the legal efficacy of such notice are two different things,” the court said.
The High Court observed that where the validity, effect and consequences of a notice are disputed, it cannot, at the stage of an application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, proceed on the assumption that all requirements for a decree of possession have been admitted.
The court further held that the disputed questions regarding the nature and use of the premises, the validity and effect of the notice and the defences raised by the respondent made it inappropriate to bring the litigation to an end without giving the parties an opportunity to lead evidence.
Referring to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Rajiv Ghosh v. Satya Narayan Jaiswal, the court noted that Order XII Rule 6 CPC is enabling, discretionary and permissive and not mandatory or peremptory.
The High Court also relied upon the Supreme Court’s recent judgment in Pushpa and others v. Dayawati and others, observing that a revisional court cannot substitute its own interpretation merely because another view is possible.
Justice Khajuria Kazmi held that the trial court’s decision was legally sustainable and did not suffer from any jurisdictional error, material irregularity or perversity warranting interference under Section 115 CPC.
“The trial Court has rightly declined to pass a decree on admissions and has left the disputed questions to be adjudicated after the parties would lead their evidence,” the court held.
The revision petition was accordingly dismissed as devoid of merit.
The High Court clarified, however, that its observations would not be treated as an opinion on the merits of the claims and defences in the main suit. It directed the trial court to decide the case strictly in accordance with law and on the basis of evidence brought on record, uninfluenced by the observations made in the High Court order.
