SRINAGAR: The High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh at Srinagar has quashed a preventive detention order issued against a Srinagar resident under the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, holding that the authorities failed to establish a live and proximate link between the alleged past criminal activity and the need for preventive detention, besides failing to demonstrate compliance with a mandatory statutory safeguard requiring reference of the case to the Advisory Board.
Justice M A Chowdhary, in a judgment pronounced on September 19, allowed a petition filed by Numan Qayoom Ganie of Methan, Chanpora, Srinagar, and quashed detention Order No. DMS/PSA/07/2025 dated April 29, 2025, passed by the District Magistrate, Srinagar under Section 8 of the J&K Public Safety Act, 1978. The court directed the respondents to release Ganie forthwith if his custody was not required in connection with any other case.
Ganie had approached the High Court through advocate Wajid Mohammad Haseeb, challenging the detention order on several grounds. The respondents—the Union Territory of J&K, the District Magistrate, Srinagar, and the Senior Superintendent of Police, Srinagar—were represented by Senior Additional Advocate General Mohsin Qadri, assisted by counsel Haris Khan.
The petitioner argued that the material relied upon by the detaining authority was stale and that the criminal case cited against him, FIR No. 53/2022 registered at Police Station Saddar under Sections 121 and 121-A of the IPC and Sections 16, 17, 18 and 40 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, was from 2022. He pointed out that he had already been granted bail in that case and argued that the detention grounds disclosed no proximate intervening activity capable of establishing a “live link” between the alleged past conduct and the necessity for preventive detention in 2025. He also challenged the alleged non-application of mind by the detaining authority.
The respondents opposed the petition, maintaining that the District Magistrate had considered the material placed before him and arrived at the requisite subjective satisfaction that preventive detention was necessary. They also stated that the petitioner had been bound down under Sections 126 and 170 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita in connection with what they described as his continuous involvement in anti-national and unlawful activities. According to the respondents, the material disclosed his association with elements inimical to the security of the State. They further relied on the fact that the representation submitted on the petitioner’s behalf had been considered and rejected.
After examining the detention record, the court emphasised that preventive detention was an exceptional power involving a serious restriction on personal liberty. “The power is preventive and not punitive,” Justice Chowdhary observed, stressing that the material relied upon by a detaining authority must have a “live and proximate link” with the object sought to be achieved through detention. Referring to Supreme Court judgments in Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu and Sama Aruna v. State of Telangana, the court noted that stale incidents could not ordinarily form the basis of preventive detention unless circumstances establishing continuity and proximity were disclosed.
Applying that principle to Ganie’s case, the court found a substantial temporal gap between FIR No. 53/2022 and the detention order passed in 2025. More importantly, it found that the record did not disclose any sufficiently proximate intervening prejudicial activity capable of bridging that gap.
“The mere reference to vague antecedents cannot substitute the requirement of a live and proximate nexus,” the court said, adding that while antecedents could constitute relevant material, they could not by themselves convert stale material into proximate material warranting preventive detention.
The fact that Ganie had already been granted bail in the 2022 FIR also weighed with the court. It held that where a person released on bail was subsequently sought to be preventively detained, the detaining authority had to demonstrate conscious consideration of that circumstance and produce cogent material showing a real possibility of the person engaging in prejudicial activities despite his release.
In the present case, the court said the detention order and supporting material did not satisfactorily disclose any subsequent circumstance, violation of bail conditions, fresh prejudicial activity or other compelling material that had persuaded the detaining authority that ordinary criminal law had become insufficient and preventive detention had become necessary.
The court also found the grounds of detention vulnerable on the issue of independent application of mind. It held that the subjective satisfaction required under the Public Safety Act could not be a mere formality or mechanical reproduction of a police dossier.
“If the grounds merely reproduce the allegations contained in the dossier without demonstrating why those allegations, viewed in the circumstances prevailing on the date of detention, necessitated preventive detention, the satisfaction of the detaining authority becomes vulnerable on the ground of non-application of mind,” the court observed.
The High Court identified another fundamental defect in the detention process concerning the Advisory Board. Referring to Section 15 of the J&K Public Safety Act, the court noted that the Government is required to place the grounds of detention and any representation before the Advisory Board within four weeks from the date of detention.
The court held that such reference was not optional. “The statutory scheme makes such reference a mandatory safeguard in every case of detention,” it said, explaining that the Advisory Board mechanism was intended to provide an independent statutory check against arbitrary or unjustified deprivation of liberty.
In Ganie’s case, the respondents failed to place on record material demonstrating that his case had been duly referred to the Advisory Board within the period prescribed under Section 15. The court held that this amounted to a serious statutory infirmity.
“The continued detention of the petitioner cannot be sustained merely on the strength of the original detention order when the mandatory statutory safeguard contemplated under Section 15 has not been shown to have been complied with,” the court said.
The court concluded that the detention suffered from multiple legal infirmities, including reliance on stale and remote material, absence of a live and proximate link with the detention, inadequate consideration of the petitioner’s grant of bail, failure to demonstrate independent application of mind and failure to establish compliance with the mandatory Advisory Board requirement.
It accordingly held that Ganie’s detention could not be sustained and quashed the April 29, 2025 detention order. The respondents were directed to release him forthwith, subject to his custody not being required in any other case. The petition was disposed of accordingly.
