by Peerzada Mohsin Shafi
To assert, nearly a decade on, that these projects hold no tangible benefit is to undermine the very principles of long-term planning and development.
Unless the central government and the Union Territory administration act with urgency to revive and revalidate these projects under the current policy framework, the window of opportunity may soon close—perhaps permanently.
Nearly nine years after their initial approval, two of Jammu and Kashmir’s most critical infrastructure ventures—the Singhpora-Vailoo Tunnel and the Sudhmahadev-Dranga Tunnel—remain ensnared in a web of delays, shifting policies, and bureaucratic hurdles. Public hopes have once again been dashed. Sanctioned in 2017 under the Bharatmala Pariyojana, these tunnels were envisioned as transformative arteries that would establish all-weather connectivity between South Kashmir and the Chenab region. By bypassing the treacherous Sinthan Top Road, a mountainous stretch notorious for its sharp curves and prolonged closures due to heavy snowfall, the tunnels promised not only safety but also regional economic upliftment.
Though tendered for the first time in 2023, both projects suffered an abrupt setback when the tenders were cancelled in 2024. Initially, the explanations centred around administrative complications, but later reports revealed that the Union Home Ministry had refused clearance to the lowest bidder—an Azerbaijani construction firm. The decision provoked widespread frustration among residents of both Kashmir and Chenab, who had pinned their hopes on the projects as catalysts for connectivity and development.
Nearly a year later, political leaders, including a Member of Parliament from the Anantnag-Rajouri constituency, raised the matter with relevant ministries and executing agencies. Assurances followed. The tenders would be reissued, and the projects awarded by mid-2025. Union Minister for Road Transport and Highways, Nitin Gadkari, reiterated this commitment during the recent inauguration of the Z-Morh, now Sonamarg Tunnel. In the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly, Deputy Minister Surinder Choudhary confirmed that although these projects were originally sanctioned under the now-defunct Bharatmala scheme, they were under fresh consideration for approval through the NH(O) scheme.
Ground progress appeared promising. Land acquisition had been completed for both projects, and forest clearances neared their final stages. Buoyed by official reassurances and extensive media coverage, the public remained hopeful. However, in a development reported by The Times of India on 22 March 2025, the Public Investment Board (PIB), chaired by the Expenditure Secretary, rejected the funding proposal for the twin tunnels. Citing high costs, doubtful techno-feasibility, and the presence of an “adequate” alternative route, the PIB declared there was no direct, demonstrable benefit from constructing the tunnels. Yet, according to reliable sources, the report was misquoted. The projects had not been dismissed outright; only certain objections were raised.
This ambiguity triggered disbelief and discomforting questions. Experts argue that the Detailed Project Reports (DPRs), prepared after rigorous technical and traffic feasibility studies, had already addressed such concerns. Even leaving aside the DPR for NH-244, the DPRs for the five tunnels currently under construction on NH-44 (Srinagar-Jammu National Highway) between Ramban and Banihal—prepared by ICT and Altinok in 2018–19—confirm that NH-44 was to be upgraded from four to six lanes by 2026 to manage rising traffic volumes. However, the challenging geological terrain renders such expansion technically unfeasible. Even the ongoing four-lane work remains incomplete. Against this backdrop, NH-244, which originates in Chenani and ends in Anantnag, emerges as a strategically viable and sustainable alternative. Rerouting traffic from Chenani through the proposed tunnels and reconnecting at Alstop Wanpoh could create a dependable, all-weather corridor between Jammu and Kashmir, easing congestion on NH-44.
Substantial investment has already been channelled into the NH-244 corridor. This includes the construction of a ten-kilometre greenfield road from Alstop on NH-44 and the implementation of multiple work packages to upgrade the NH-244 alignment. These developments were conceived with the tunnel projects in mind. Likewise, the Anantnag-Vailoo road—formerly a district road under the Border Roads Organisation (BRO)—was elevated to national highway status in 2017 specifically to link Kashmir with the Chenab Valley through these tunnels. With their cancellation, the rationale behind these upgrades now stands on precarious ground.
The current stalemate evokes uncomfortable echoes of the Mughal Road Tunnel project, another long-promised development mired in delay. Although a tender was floated in 2017 for preparing its DPR, the project has since stagnated. Its listing remains on the NHIDCL’s Infracon portal—an unsettling digital fossil, a testament to how easily strategic infrastructure in Jammu and Kashmir can fall victim to shifting priorities and administrative inertia.
The Singhpora-Vailoo and Sudhmahadev-Dranga tunnels were never merely infrastructure projects; they came to embody hope—for reliable connectivity, economic integration, and a safer, more prosperous future for two historically underserved regions. Their abrupt sidelining by the Public Investment Board has left communities feeling not only disappointed but betrayed. Years of effort—public funding, institutional focus, and detailed groundwork, including feasibility studies and land acquisition—now appear to hang in vain. To assert, nearly a decade on, that these projects hold no tangible benefit is to undermine the very principles of long-term planning and development.
Yet, despite the PIB’s rejection of the Vailoo-Singhpora and Sudhmahadev-Dranga tunnels on 22 March 2025, a measure of optimism persists. History offers reassurance that initial refusals need not be final. Several major infrastructure projects have navigated similar setbacks before emerging successfully. The Mumbai Trans Harbour Link, for instance, encountered a string of obstacles—environmental clearances, funding difficulties, and an inability to attract private bids under its original public-private partnership model. The project was later restructured under the engineering, procurement, and construction model, with the Japan International Cooperation Agency stepping in with a loan of ₹8,600 crore, paving the way for completion.
In Maharashtra, the Upper Tapi Dam and Shelgaon Barrage were both rejected in 2019 but, following revisions and reassessments, received clearance in 2021. Closer to home, the Baglihar Dam in Jammu and Kashmir faced years of delay owing to environmental and political complications. Once those concerns were addressed, the project was approved and executed in two stages, significantly enhancing the region’s electricity generation capacity.
Financial considerations are often decisive in determining the fate of such ventures. When domestic funding proves inadequate, international agencies like JICA can offer critical support. JICA’s loan of ₹18,750 crore for the Mumbai-Ahmedabad High-Speed Rail Project—one of its largest commitments for a single initiative globally—stands as a testament to the transformative potential of international collaboration.
These examples serve as reminders that the Singhpora-Vailoo and Sudhmahadev-Dranga tunnels still possess the potential for resurrection. Should the objections be resolved and the appropriate financial channels activated, the projects may yet be revived. However, time is slipping. Unless the central government and the Union Territory administration act with urgency to revalidate the tunnels under the current policy framework, the opportunity may soon pass irrevocably.
What remains is a delicate, flickering hope—a hope that political will or mounting public pressure might one day break through the layers of bureaucracy, policy drift, and unmet promises. For now, the vision of these tunnels lies dormant, buried beneath paperwork and expectation.
(The author is a research scholar and columnist with an MTech in Infrastructure Development and Management. He is a member of ASCE, IAENG, and IIQS. Ideas are personal.)
