by Asad Mirza
Israeli and American statements signal heightened military preparedness and strategic pressure on Tehran, raising concerns about renewed conflict, regional escalation, global energy security and India’s diplomatic balancing.
Israeli and American statements in New York signal an emphasis on military readiness and deterrence rather than a publicly announced decision to attack Iran. Read together with reports of Israeli pressure on Washington for renewed strikes, they point to a volatile mix of military preparation, diplomatic pressure and regional risk, with consequences extending beyond the Middle East to global energy security, shipping and India’s strategic balancing.
Israeli-American preparations for a possible renewed confrontation with Iran appear to be intensifying. Reports suggest that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been pressing US President Donald Trump to resume military strikes against Iran, reportedly calling him daily in recent days. Washington, meanwhile, appears to be weighing diplomacy alongside military pressure.
Remarks made at the Israel Hayom Summit in New York on November 11 have added to the speculation about another possible confrontation. However, they indicate heightened preparedness rather than confirming an imminent military operation.
The Israel Hayom Summit is a newspaper-organised conference, not a government or military planning forum. Its second New York edition brought together Israeli and American political, security and community figures to discuss bilateral relations, regional security and diplomacy.
Among the prominent speakers was Boaz Levy, chairman of Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), who spoke about Israel’s preparedness for another confrontation with Iran.
The Times of Israel and Axios have separately reported that Netanyahu pressed Trump in a recent telephone conversation to strike Iran soon, citing Israeli and American sources.
Levy’s assessment was particularly striking. He told Israel Hayom that Israel must prepare for another war with Iran, describing the question as one of “when”, rather than “if”.
Military Preparedness
Levy referred to the performance of Israel’s Arrow missile-defence system during Iranian missile barrages, claiming that it had achieved an interception rate of 92 per cent.
He also said Israel and the United States were expanding interceptor production and developing capabilities to intercept missiles at higher altitudes. Describing the growing importance of space-based military technology, he referred to an Israeli satellite providing real-time information to a fighter pilot.
These remarks underline the importance Israel attaches to missile defence and technological preparedness. However, Levy heads a defence industry organisation, and his comments should not be interpreted as an official Israeli government announcement of a decision to resume hostilities.
The American position articulated at the summit was more political.
US Ambassador to the United Nations Mike Waltz reportedly described Iran’s regime as weaker than ever and suggested that the Abraham Accords were expanding. In a separate September interview with Al-Monitor, Waltz had said that the door remained open for Iran to return to negotiations, arguing that time was on Washington’s side.
Taken together, these statements suggest that Washington is pursuing two approaches simultaneously: maintaining pressure on Tehran while keeping the possibility of negotiations open.
There are, nevertheless, indications of military preparations beyond the summit rhetoric.
NPR reported in October, citing a person briefed on US-Israeli war planning, that the two countries were preparing for a possible attack after the US midterm elections. The report also suggested that the military build-up could be intended to pressure Tehran into reaching an agreement.
The claim was attributed to an unnamed source and was not an official announcement of American policy. Levy’s remarks reinforce the impression of long-term military readiness but do not independently establish that an operation is imminent.
The danger of escalation
The most significant regional implication is that missile defence is increasingly being treated as a permanent requirement rather than a temporary response to a particular conflict.
Levy’s description of expanding interceptor production and upgrading defence systems suggests that Israel expects Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities to remain a central security concern.
Improved interception capabilities could strengthen deterrence by reducing the expected damage from an Iranian attack. However, missile defence cannot guarantee complete protection. Even a high interception rate leaves the possibility of missiles getting through. The cost and availability of interceptors could also become significant constraints during prolonged or repeated attacks.
The 92 per cent interception figure cited by Levy remains his claim, as reported by Israel Hayom, and has not been independently verified in the material available.
There is also a larger strategic danger. Military preparations that Israel describes as defensive could be interpreted by Tehran as groundwork for another offensive campaign.
Iran could respond by strengthening its own military preparedness or seeking to restore deterrence through pressure on regional shipping and infrastructure. Such a cycle could create a security dilemma in which both sides claim to be preventing an attack while making the other increasingly fearful of being struck first.
Waltz’s description of Iran as weakened could also encourage a belief in Washington that intensified pressure might produce further concessions. Conversely, his acknowledgement that negotiations remain possible leaves diplomatic space open.
The strategic choice is therefore not simply between striking Iran and negotiating with it. Military readiness can strengthen a negotiating position, but it can also narrow the space for compromise when political leaders begin presenting another war as inevitable.
The consequences of renewed hostilities would extend well beyond Israel and Iran.
Iranian officials have previously warned of retaliation against US interests and infrastructure in countries participating in a conflict. This raises the exposure of Gulf states hosting American forces, as well as commercial shipping and energy infrastructure.
The Strait of Hormuz is particularly important. The Centre for Strategic and International Studies has described it as carrying roughly a quarter of global oil flows and documented substantial shipping disruptions during the conflict.
Any renewed confrontation threatening the waterway could quickly transform a regional military crisis into a global energy and economic shock.
Deeper US-Israel military integration
Levy’s comments also highlighted the growing technological and strategic integration between Israel and the United States.
His emphasis on shared American-Israeli funding for the Arrow missile-defence programme presents the system as a joint industrial and strategic undertaking. His account of satellite information reaching a fighter pilot’s cockpit in real time points towards closer integration of space-based surveillance, communications and military operations.
Such cooperation could extend beyond weapons production to intelligence-sharing, research, communications and operational coordination.
The summit also discussed the American Golden Dome initiative, placing Israeli missile-defence technology within a wider conversation about future defence cooperation. Levy’s remarks, however, do not establish any specific agreement or deployment.
The partnership has obvious advantages for both countries. Shared development can distribute costs, increase production capacity and improve interoperability between their defence systems.
But it also carries risks. Greater integration could make Washington more directly implicated in any future Israeli-Iranian confrontation, whether through intelligence support, military assistance or regional force deployments.
The distinction between helping Israel intercept incoming missiles and participating in offensive military action would consequently become politically and strategically important.
The American statements at the summit leave this question unresolved. Waltz’s assessment that Iran is weakened signals confidence in the pressure campaign, while his earlier remarks about negotiations suggest that Washington has not entirely closed the diplomatic route.
NPR’s reporting about military preparations, coupled with its suggestion that these could be intended to push Tehran towards a deal, illustrates why military readiness should not automatically be interpreted as a final decision to attack.
India’s strategic exposure
For India, the most immediate concern is not the rhetoric emerging from New York but the possibility of another disruption in the Gulf.
India is a major energy importer and remains heavily exposed to developments affecting Gulf supplies and shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.
According to the Atlantic Council, before passage restrictions began in March, approximately 45 per cent of India’s crude oil imports, half of its liquefied natural gas imports and 90 per cent of its liquefied petroleum gas imports passed through the strait.
India is the world’s third-largest oil importer and an important refiner and exporter of petroleum products. Any renewed military confrontation that pushes up international oil prices or disrupts shipping could therefore affect domestic fuel costs, inflation and trade.
The diplomatic consequences could be equally complicated.
New Delhi has substantial strategic and economic interests in maintaining relations with the United States, Israel, Iran and the Gulf Arab states. A renewed US-Israeli military campaign would put these relationships under pressure.
India would likely have to balance calls for de-escalation with the need to protect its energy supplies, commercial shipping and wider regional interests. Its precise response would depend on the scale of hostilities, the countries involved and whether Indian nationals or commercial interests were directly affected.
The crisis also highlights the limitations of relying on alternative energy suppliers during a sudden disruption.
Atlantic Council analysis has pointed to the possibility of increased American energy exports supporting India’s diversification efforts. However, alternative suppliers and routes cannot immediately insulate the Indian economy from a global supply shock.
Long-term resilience would require diversified sourcing, adequate strategic reserves and secure maritime passage.
Readiness is not a decision to attack
The clearest reading of the New York summit is that Israel is preparing for the possibility of another confrontation with Iran while Washington continues to combine strategic pressure with the stated possibility of diplomacy.
Levy articulated the defence industry’s expectation of future conflict and emphasised the need for technological preparedness. Waltz presented an Iran weakened by pressure but also referred to the possibility of negotiations.
Neither statement establishes a timetable for renewed military action.
The critical decisions remain undisclosed: what terms Washington might offer Tehran, what limits it would place on Israeli military action, and whether diplomatic engagement can prevent another confrontation.
For the wider region, the danger is that military preparedness, intended to strengthen deterrence, could instead accelerate escalation through mistrust and miscalculation.
For India and the global economy, the stakes are particularly high. A conflict involving Iran would not remain confined to the battlefield. Its effects could travel through the Strait of Hormuz, international energy markets and the strategic calculations of countries far beyond the Middle East.
The question, therefore, is not merely whether Israel and the United States are preparing for another war with Iran, but whether their preparations will ultimately prevent one or make it increasingly difficult to avoid.
(The writer is a New Delhi-based senior commentator on national, international, defence and strategic affairs, environmental issues, an interfaith practitioner, and a media consultant. Ideas are personal.)
