SRINAGAR: The Jammu Kashmir and Ladakh High Court has dismissed a petition filed by teachers of Army Goodwill School, Wayne, Kupwara, holding that the privately run, self-financed institution is not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in service-related disputes.
Justice Shahzad Azeem pronounced the judgment on August 5, 2026, after reserving it on July 31. The petition, WP (C) No. 1911/2019, had been filed by Showkat Yousuf Shah and others against the Union of India and other respondents. The petitioners were represented by advocates Anjum Ara and Asif Nabi, while Deputy Solicitor General of India Tahir Majid Shamsi, assisted by advocate Yasmeen Jan, appeared for the respondents.
The case concerned teachers appointed as PRTs, TGTs and PGTs in the school between 2013 and 2017. The petitioners claimed that they held substantive posts in the CBSE-affiliated school and were entitled to the pay scale of Rs 9,300-34,800 plus Grade Pay of Rs 4,200 in accordance with CBSE guidelines.
According to the petitioners, after they sought fixation of their salaries according to the CBSE scales, the school management became hostile and began the process of holding fresh interviews and making new appointments. They approached the High Court apprehending that their services could be illegally terminated or their positions replaced. They sought protection against termination as well as a direction for payment of salary according to the CBSE scales. They also invoked the doctrine of legitimate expectation.
The respondents, however, raised a preliminary objection that the writ petition itself was not maintainable. They argued that Army Goodwill School, Wayne, was neither a government department nor a government-aided institution, but a self-financed institution established under the Army’s Operation Sadbhavana. They further maintained that the teachers had been engaged on yearly contractual appointments by the School Management Committee.
The respondents also argued that a writ under Article 226 could not ordinarily be invoked to enforce a contract of personal service against a private or self-financed institution unless a clear public or statutory duty was involved. They maintained that contractual employees had no vested right to continuation, renewal or regularisation beyond the terms of their contracts.
The High Court examined the institutional structure of the school and noted that Army Goodwill Public School, Wayne, was established under Operation Sadbhavana with the objective of providing quality education to children in Jammu and Kashmir. The Army Goodwill Education Society, registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, functions as the apex body for its administration and management.
The court noted that detailed Standard Operating Procedures govern recruitment, qualifications, appointments, pay and allowances, pay scales and termination of staff. However, it also recorded that the school did not receive annual financial assistance from the government or any statutory authority. It was run through self-generated funds and support from NGOs and corporate foundations, besides limited amounts received under Operation Sadbhavana.
The petitioners had relied on two Supreme Court judgments, including Bhola Nath v State of Jharkhand and Kangra Central Cooperative Bank Pensioners Welfare Association v State of Himachal Pradesh. The High Court found both distinguishable from the present case.
In Bhola Nath, the Supreme Court had intervened where employees had been appointed against sanctioned vacant government posts and had continued for more than a decade under the label of contractual employment. The High Court held that the circumstances were materially different in the case before it because the teachers’ employment was governed by the contractual framework contained in the school’s SOP.
The court also found that the Kangra Central Cooperative Bank judgment did not assist the petitioners because that case involved deep and pervasive state control over the bank, including government shareholding and a predominant role of the state. The petitioners had not established a similar factual foundation in the case of the Army Goodwill School.
Instead, the High Court relied substantially on the Supreme Court’s judgment in Army Welfare Education Society, New Delhi v Sunil Kumar Sharma & Ors., which examined whether a private unaided educational institution performing a public function could be subjected to writ jurisdiction in a pure service dispute.
The High Court noted the Supreme Court’s distinction between public duty and public law. Although imparting education may involve a public duty, that fact alone does not make every employment dispute involving a private educational institution subject to Article 226.
The Supreme Court had held, as noted by the High Court, that the relationship between a private unaided educational institution and its employees remains essentially that of a private employer and employee arising from a private contract, and that a breach of such a contract does not, by itself, involve a public law element.
The High Court further noted the Supreme Court’s finding that CBSE affiliation bye-laws do not have statutory force. According to the judgment, CBSE affiliation is primarily for recognition, syllabus and courses of study and does not, by itself, make the employment relationship statutory.
Applying that principle, Justice Azeem held that Army Goodwill School, Wayne, was neither a government department nor a government-aided institution. Nor could it be regarded as a person or authority performing a public duty “in connection with the employment of the Petitioners” against which a writ of mandamus could be issued.
The court emphasised that the school was a self-financed institution established under Operation Sadbhavana and was neither created by statute nor governed by service rules having statutory force. The relationship between the teachers and the school was therefore that of a private employer and employees, governed by contractual stipulations contained in the SOP.
Consequently, the court held that the SOP could not be enforced under Article 226 and that the dispute was not amenable to judicial review under the High Court’s writ jurisdiction.
“Only those decisions which possess a public element can be subjected to judicial scrutiny under Article 226,” the court observed, adding that where the action challenged lacks a public law element, a writ of mandamus cannot be issued because the action remains essentially private in character.
The High Court consequently upheld the respondents’ preliminary objection, declared the writ petition non-maintainable and dismissed it. Any interim directions operating in the matter were vacated, while pending applications were also disposed of.
