Jammu Kashmir HC Upholds Disciplinary Proceedings Against BRO Engineer Over Rs 4.5 Lakh Financial Transactions

   

SRINAGAR: The High Court of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh has dismissed a writ petition filed by a Border Roads Organisation (BRO) engineer challenging disciplinary proceedings against him over alleged financial transactions totalling Rs 4.5 lakh with a labourer under his official command, holding that there was no ground to interfere with the charges at this preliminary stage. Justice Sanjay Dhar ruled that members of the General Reserve Engineer Force (GREF) are subject to a dual disciplinary framework and that the competent authority was entitled to proceed against the petitioner under the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965.

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The judgment in WP(C) No. 1082/2025 was reserved on July 9 and pronounced on August 7, 2026. Badavath Kishan, an Executive Engineer (Civil) holding a rank equivalent to that of Major in 18 RCC, had challenged a memorandum of charges dated February 27, 2025, issued under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. He was represented by advocates Tapas Das and Syed Faheem Indrabi, while the Union of India was represented by Deputy Advocate General Hakim Aman Ali.

The charges relate to Kishan’s tenure as Officer Commanding of 18 RCC, Project Vijayak, from November 2019 to March 14, 2022. The authorities alleged that during the period he entered into prohibited financial transactions with CPL/Mazdoor Alauddin Ansari, a labourer deployed at Detachment Hanuthang within the area of responsibility of 81 RCC.

According to the memorandum, Kishan received a total of Rs 4.50 lakh through cash and digital payments from Ansari during 2021-22 in connection with the recruitment of labourers in the area of 81 RCC. The transactions, the authorities said, were corroborated by bank statements and other records.

One transaction of Rs 1 lakh was traced to Kishan’s Axis Bank account on June 4, 2021, with the IMPS entry and Unique Transaction Reference corresponding to a transfer from Ansari. The charges further alleged that Ansari transferred another Rs 2 lakh in five instalments to two other persons, Pulakhandam and Srinivasa Gupta, who were suspected of being known to Kishan.

Kishan, however, disputed the allegations. He maintained that the Rs 1 lakh credited to his account was repayment of a loan he had taken from a general store owner named Sudhir during the Covid pandemic. He said the money had been deposited through one Farhan and produced a copy of an affidavit sworn by Sudhir in support of his contention.

He also challenged the disciplinary proceedings on the ground that they were based on a Court of Inquiry allegedly conducted in violation of Rule 180 of the Army Rules, 1954. He claimed that he had not been present throughout the proceedings and had not been given an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses whose evidence affected his character and reputation.

The petitioner further contended that the memorandum of charges was vague, relied on surmises and conjectures and had been issued belatedly.

The Union government opposed the petition, saying that the Court of Inquiry had examined the alleged financial transactions on the basis of bank statements, cash books and other documents. The authorities said Kishan had been given an opportunity to defend himself during the disciplinary inquiry and that the writ petition was premature because the actual inquiry into the charges had yet to take place.

The High Court first examined the scope of Rule 180 of the Army Rules. The provision requires that where an inquiry affects the character or military reputation of a person subject to the Army Act, the person must be given an opportunity to be present throughout the inquiry, make a statement, give evidence, cross-examine witnesses and produce witnesses in defence.

Justice Dhar agreed with the petitioner that the Supreme Court had held Rule 180 to be mandatory in cases to which it applied. The central question, however, was whether the rule applied to Kishan’s case.

The court noted that Kishan was a member of the GREF/BRO and not regular Army personnel. The BRO is under the Ministry of Defence and its personnel are partly drawn from the Army and partly recruited directly. While the organisation operates under the supervision of Army authorities, civilian GREF personnel are governed by the CCS (CCA) Rules for disciplinary purposes and are also subject to specified provisions of the Army Act and Army Rules.

Referring to the Supreme Court’s ruling in R Viswan v Union of India, the High Court noted that the statutory framework subjects GREF personnel to a dual disciplinary regime. The Supreme Court had held that directly recruited GREF personnel were governed by the CCS (CCA) Rules but were also subject to specified provisions of the Army Act and Army Rules for purposes of discipline.

The High Court also relied upon the Supreme Court judgment in Mohammad Ansari v Union of India, which explained the circumstances in which civilian GREF personnel could be proceeded against under the Army Act or the CCS (CCA) Rules.

“Members of GREF/BRO are subject to a dual disciplinary authority,” Justice Dhar held, adding that a GREF member could be proceeded against either under the Army Act and the rules framed under it or under the CCS (CCA) Rules. The choice, he said, rested with the disciplinary authority.

Applying that principle to Kishan’s case, the court found that the allegation concerned financial dealings with a person with whom the petitioner had official dealings, conduct prohibited under Rule 16(4)(i)(a) of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964. It held that the alleged misconduct was not of such a grave nature as to require proceedings under the Army Act and that the competent authority had therefore legitimately chosen to proceed under the CCS (CCA) Rules.

The court accordingly held that even if Rule 180 had not been followed during the preliminary Court of Inquiry, that would not invalidate the disciplinary proceedings initiated under the CCS (CCA) Rules.

“The judgments relied upon by the petitioner” concerning Rule 180, the court said, related to cases where officers were proceeded against under the Army Act and faced court martial proceedings. “The ratio laid down in those judgments is not attracted to the facts of the present case.”

The High Court also rejected the argument that the charges were vague. The memorandum, it said, clearly identified the person with whom Kishan allegedly conducted the financial transactions, specified the amount involved and set out the relevant bank transactions and other supporting material.

Justice Dhar stressed that the scope of judicial intervention at the stage of framing disciplinary charges was extremely limited. A court could interfere only where the charges were contrary to law or so vague that the employee was prevented from mounting an effective defence.

At this stage, the court said, it could not examine whether the allegations were true or false. That question was for the disciplinary authority and inquiry officer to determine.

The court relied on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Union of India v Upendra Singh, which holds that judicial review at the stage of framing charges is concerned with the legality of the decision-making process and not with determining the truth of the allegations.

The High Court also rejected the plea of delay. The transactions in question related to 2021 and 2022 and were preceded by a Court of Inquiry to ascertain the veracity of the allegations. The memorandum of charges was issued only thereafter, on February 27, 2025.

Justice Dhar observed that although disciplinary proceedings should ordinarily be initiated without undue delay, there was “no straight-jacket formula” under which an inquiry would automatically become invalid merely because it was initiated after a particular period.

Holding that Kishan had failed to establish that the charges were contrary to law or lacked material particulars, the High Court dismissed the petition and vacated the interim order. The record was directed to be returned to the counsel for the respondents.

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