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Wednesday, November 18, 2026
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Jammu Kashmir High Court Restores Cheque Bounce Case, Sets Aside Trial Court Order

   

SRINAGAR: The Jammu Kashmir and Ladakh High Court has restored a cheque bounce complaint filed by a private finance company after holding that the trial court was not justified in dismissing it over the complainant’s absence, particularly when his medical condition had prevented him from appearing.

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The High Court also directed the trial court to proceed with the matter expeditiously and make an endeavour to conclude the proceedings within three months.

Allowing an appeal filed by M/s Makhan Shah Lobana Finance Pvt. Ltd. against an order dated February 2, 2019, passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jammu, Justice Yash Paul Bourney set aside the dismissal of the complaint and ordered its restoration for further proceedings in accordance with law.

The complaint had been filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act against S Mohinder Singh. It was dismissed in default of appearance, resulting in the respondent’s acquittal under Section 247 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The finance company, through its Managing Director S Rawail Singh, challenged the trial court’s decision, contending that the complainant was an elderly person suffering from various ailments and could not appear on the date fixed for hearing.

It was submitted that his doctor had advised him to remain on complete bed rest for two weeks with effect from January 30, 2019, owing to his medical condition, which prevented him from attending the court on February 2, 2019.

Opposing the appeal, counsel for the respondent argued that the finance company had repeatedly sought adjournments and opportunities to produce the loan documents but failed to produce the original records, resulting in the deferment of the complainant’s cross-examination.

The respondent further alleged that the complaint was false and frivolous, claiming that he had already repaid the loan taken for one vehicle and that an old cheque had been misused to raise a claim relating to loans for two other vehicles that he had never obtained.

It was also argued that restoring the complaint at this stage would seriously prejudice the respondent, who was also elderly, and effectively restart proceedings after considerable delay.

The High Court, after examining the trial court record, observed that the respondent had not disputed his signatures on the cheque in question and had admitted obtaining a loan, although he maintained that the amount had been repaid and that he had received a receipt or no-objection certificate.

The court noted that the respondent had denied the accusations when they were read over to him on November 27, 2017. It also observed that he had not referred to any adjustment of the advance amount against one vehicle, as alleged in the complaint, or submitted a reply to the demand notice.

Examining the proceedings before the trial court, Justice Bourney noted that the complainant had been examined in chief, but his cross-examination was deferred three times to enable the production of loan documents.

The finance company had produced photocopies of relevant documents and certain other records, but was subsequently directed to produce the originals.

The High Court observed that the complainant had been pursuing the case seriously and that his absence on February 2, 2019, was attributable to his medical condition, which had been supported by the doctor’s advice.

“In such matters, the trial Court must not have hastened to draw the conclusions and more so when the appellant happened to be a senior citizen,” the court observed.

The court also examined the scope of Section 247 of the CrPC and referred to the Supreme Court’s judgment in The Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. Keshvanand, reported as AIR 1998 SC 596.

It observed that Section 247 empowered a Magistrate to bring proceedings to an end where a complainant adopted dilatory tactics, keeping in view the inconvenience and harassment caused to an accused required to attend court on successive dates.

However, the court pointed out that the provision also gave the Magistrate the option of either adjourning the case where the complainant’s presence was necessary or proceeding with the trial where such presence was not considered necessary.

In the present case, the High Court noted that neither the complainant nor the accused was present when the complaint was dismissed, although the respondent’s counsel appeared and sought exemption.

It further observed that the complainant had been granted exemption on January 30, 2019, on account of his illness, and there was no justification for listing the matter just three days later and dismissing the complaint on February 2.

The court also held that repeated deferment of the complainant’s cross-examination for production of original loan documents was not warranted.

It observed that if the complainant failed to produce the original documents, the trial court could have considered drawing an adverse inference, but that did not justify repeatedly postponing the cross-examination at the request of the other side.

“Therefore, the trial Court was not justified in prolonging the proceedings and then, to dismiss the complaint,” the court held.

Concluding that the trial court’s order was not in accordance with law, Justice Bourney allowed the appeal and directed that the complaint file be reopened and restored for further proceedings.

The judgment was reserved on November 5, 2026, and pronounced on November 13, 2026.

The appellant was represented by advocate Pawan Kumar Khajuria, while senior advocate Mandeep Reen, assisted by advocate Sohil Mustafa, appeared for the respondent.

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