by Asad Mirza
The future of BRICS may depend less on external pressure and more on its ability to manage internal differences and define a shared approach to global governance. At present, the bloc appears to reflect the evolving power dynamics of the Global South rather than serve as a united adversary to Western influence.
The recent BRICS Summit in Rio, which raised concerns about multilateral issues, was marked by internal disagreements. It also attracted threats from the United States President, Donald Trump, who criticised the bloc’s plan to launch a new global currency intended to rival the US dollar. The proposal faces numerous challenges before any possibility of realisation.
On Friday, 18 July, President Trump dismissed BRICS as a “little group” that was “fading out fast” and reiterated a warning of a ten per cent tariff on countries aligning with it, accusing them of endorsing policies hostile to the United States.
He also claimed credit for obstructing BRICS’ effort to undermine the dominance of the dollar in global markets, asserting his commitment to preventing such a development. In a characteristically confrontational tone, he said that he had already acted against what he called the group of six countries within BRICS and declared that if they were ever to cohere in any meaningful way, it would be dismantled swiftly. Without identifying the countries by name, he emphasised that the United States could not permit such challenges to its position. He reiterated the significance of maintaining the dollar’s role as the global reserve currency, adding that losing it would be equivalent to suffering defeat in a world war.
Trump had already imposed new trade penalties on Brazil, announcing a fifty per cent tariff on imports starting in August. He justified the move by citing what he termed unfair trade practices. This decision followed his earlier pronouncement, on 6 July, of a ten per cent tariff on any country that joined or supported the BRICS alliance.
An Expanding Bloc
Originally formed in 2009, BRICS brought together Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, which joined the following year. In 2024 and 2025, the bloc expanded to admit Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, raising the total membership to eleven nations.
The group was established to foster peace, development, and a more equitable global order by strengthening economic cooperation among emerging economies. Over time, it positioned itself as a counterweight to Western-led institutions such as the G7 and the International Monetary Fund. It has consistently advocated for a multipolar world and demanded reforms to global governance. It also supports the use of local currencies in trade transactions.
However, the group now pursues a more nuanced objective. BRICS seeks to distance itself from Washington’s influence while cooperating to develop a shared high-technology industrial foundation. The bloc’s priorities reflect justified concerns. International financial institutions require reform, and wealthier nations have failed to fulfil commitments related to climate finance. In response, BRICS has created its development bank to advance a model of green industrialisation.
Yet the bloc’s scale conceals its contradictions. Its call for more inclusive global institutions appears constructive, but the dominance of autocratic regimes among its members casts doubt on its democratic credentials. BRICS affirms the importance of international law in conflicts in the Middle East, but its credibility falters when it condemns Ukrainian strikes on Russian infrastructure while ignoring Moscow’s continuous assaults on civilian targets.
Rio Summit and the Dollar Question
The BRICS summit held in Brazil last week revealed a loose coalition of emerging powers that is growing more intricate and, potentially, more influential. However, the most significant issue — the idea of replacing the US dollar in global transactions — was notably absent from formal discussions. This omission appeared to reflect the direct pressure exerted by Donald Trump.
The language of de-dollarisation currently acts more as a symbolic stance than an actual threat to the dollar’s dominance. While intentions have been voiced, the practical steps remain limited.
A recent editorial in The Guardian observed that the BRICS nations continue to show signs of unity. According to the piece, their most revealing, albeit technical, move lies in beginning to construct financial infrastructure designed to circumvent Western systems. The article noted that the group is not abandoning the dollar, but each member has experienced exclusion from global finance. India faced credit denial following the 2008 financial crisis. Iranian banks have been subject to sanctions since 2012.
The editorial added that the group’s success would depend not solely on ambition but also on its ability to align diverse national interests. This, however, remains a difficult undertaking. Domestic priorities may well override the broader collective goals.
Sarang Shidore, Director of the Global South Program at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft in Washington, DC, wrote in a letter to the Financial Times that the rise of BRICS represents a crucial multilateral adjustment. In his view, the bloc offers a counterbalance in a world long shaped by US dominance, though one now shifting away from both unipolarity and multilateralism. He acknowledged that this adjustment would carry its imperfections, yet argued that a stable global transition required it.
Dr Diego Maiorano, Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore, commented on the proposed BRICS currency. He observed that the bloc’s ambition to de-dollarise international trade was still in its earliest phase. The majority of cross-border transactions among BRICS members remain denominated in US dollars. He noted that efforts to construct alternatives, such as the BRICS Cross-Border Payment System, were still in development and not yet capable of replacing established platforms like SWIFT. While these initiatives may benefit countries such as Russia and Iran, which face financial sanctions, they are far from forming a comprehensive solution.
Christopher Phillips, Professor of International Relations at Queen Mary University of London, wrote in Arab News that Russia and China had emerged as the principal advocates for a new BRICS currency designed to rival the dollar at the Kazan meeting. However, on the eve of the Rio de Janeiro summit, threats from Donald Trump contributed to growing hesitation among other BRICS members. India, in particular, appeared cautious, wary of the potential for Chinese dominance within any such framework. As a result, little progress was achieved, and the final joint statement included references to the global role of the US dollar. This inclusion seemed intended to temper Trump’s criticism and signal a more conciliatory stance.
The future of BRICS may depend less on external pressure and more on its ability to manage internal differences and define a shared approach to global governance. At present, the bloc appears to reflect the evolving power dynamics of the Global South rather than serve as a united adversary to Western influence.
The early stages of its de-dollarisation agenda and the cautious positions taken by India and Brazil suggest that any opposition to Western-led institutions remains subdued. However, as those institutions continue to struggle with questions of legitimacy and inclusivity, BRICS — with all its internal inconsistencies — represents a growing alternative. Its presence signals a period of transition in international affairs and a call to re-evaluate the principles that underpin the existing global order.
(The author is a New Delhi-based senior commentator on national, international, defence and strategic affairs, environmental issues, an interfaith practitioner, and a media consultant. Views are personal.)
