SRINAGAR: The Jammu Kashmir and Ladakh High Court has referred an important legal question concerning the maintainability of criminal revision petitions against Magistrates’ orders directing registration of FIRs to an appropriate larger Bench, observing that the issue requires an authoritative determination in view of conflicting judicial interpretations and an existing precedent of the High Court.
Justice Sanjay Parihar, while hearing two connected petitions, directed the Registry to place the records before the Chief Justice for appropriate orders regarding the constitution of a larger Bench to examine whether an order passed under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), directing registration of an FIR and investigation, is necessarily an interlocutory order or can qualify as an intermediate order amenable to revisional jurisdiction.
The judgment, pronounced on November 17, 2026, also raises important questions about the extent to which revisional courts can examine allegations of jurisdictional errors, non-application of judicial mind and violations of mandatory statutory safeguards while dealing with directions for police investigation.
The two petitions, CRM(M) No. 678/2021 and CRM(M) No. 179/2025, arose from separate disputes but involved a common question of law concerning the scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 397(2) CrPC, which bars revision against interlocutory orders. The corresponding provision under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023, is Section 438(2), while Section 175(3) BNSS deals with the Magistrate’s power to order investigation.
The High Court noted that different High Courts have adopted divergent approaches to the issue. While the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Father Thomas v. State of Uttar Pradesh held that an order directing investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC is interlocutory and cannot be challenged in revision at the instance of a prospective accused, the Bombay High Court has followed a line of precedents recognising revisional jurisdiction against such orders.
The Jammu and Kashmir High Court itself had previously held in Satpal Sharma v. Pawan Singh Rathore that an order directing registration of an FIR under Section 156(3) CrPC is interlocutory and not amenable to criminal revision.
Justice Parihar observed that the issue could not be resolved merely by treating every order passed before the conclusion of criminal proceedings as interlocutory.
“The nature of an order must be determined with reference to its substance, effect and the legal consequences which follow from it,” the judgment states.
The Court explained that the Supreme Court, in Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra and Girish Kumar Suneja v. Central Bureau of Investigation, had recognised the distinction between final, intermediate and interlocutory orders.
An order may not terminate the entire criminal proceedings but may nevertheless possess sufficient finality in relation to a particular issue to fall outside the category of a purely interlocutory order, the Court observed.
However, it cautioned that the mere disposal of an application under Section 156(3) CrPC does not automatically make the resulting order revisable.
“The determination necessarily involves an examination of the nature of the jurisdiction exercised, the issue decided, the effect of the order and the statutory scheme within which it operates,” the judgment states.
The Court further noted that an order directing investigation is passed at the pre-cognizance stage and does not determine the guilt or innocence of the persons named in a complaint. Nevertheless, such an order has legal consequences and must be passed after proper judicial application of mind.
It emphasised that the Magistrate cannot act merely as a forwarding authority while exercising powers under Section 156(3) CrPC.
Referring to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Priyanka Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the Court reiterated that applications seeking directions for police investigation cannot be entertained mechanically and that Magistrates must exercise judicial discretion with due care and circumspection.
It also referred to Anil Kumar v. M.K. Aiyappa, which dealt with the exercise of powers under Section 156(3) CrPC in cases involving allegations against public servants and applicable statutory requirements.
The Court observed that where allegations are directed against public servants, the Magistrate must examine whether any special statutory provision, prior approval, sanction or other legal restriction applies to the proposed investigation.
At the same time, it clarified that it would be incorrect to lay down an absolute proposition that no investigation can ever be directed against a police officer without prior sanction.
“Equally, the Magistrate cannot disregard a statutory prohibition or mandatory prerequisite where the law expressly requires its compliance,” the judgment states.
Two cases before the High Court
In CRM(M) No. 179/2025, Bharat Bhushan and Anuj Sajgotra had challenged an order dated June 3, 2024, passed by the Munsiff, Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bishnah, allowing an application filed by Neelam Gorkha under Section 156(3) CrPC and directing the Station House Officer, Police Station Bishnah, to register an FIR.
The petitioners subsequently challenged the Magistrate’s order before the Additional Sessions Judge, Jammu. However, the revisional court, through an order dated February 28, 2025, dismissed their revision petition as non-maintainable, holding that an order directing registration of an FIR was interlocutory in nature.
The petitioners then approached the High Court.
According to their case, they had been in possession of a shop operating as M/s National Medical Hall near Sub-District Hospital, Bishnah, since 1993.
Petitioner No. 1 had initially obtained the premises on rent from Neelam Gorkha’s late husband, Guldev Raj Gorkha, through a registered rent deed. Following his death in February 2006, a fresh rent agreement was executed between the parties on June 8, 2007, for three years.
The petitioners claimed that after the agreement expired, they continued to occupy the premises with mutual consent, operating their business under the requisite drug licence and regularly paying rent, municipal taxes and electricity charges.
They alleged that from November 15, 2023, the respondent and her sons began threatening them with forcible dispossession and asked them to vacate the premises by November 25, 2023.
Apprehending eviction, they filed a civil suit seeking a permanent prohibitory injunction. On November 20, 2023, the civil court passed an interim order restraining their forcible dispossession, which was subsequently implemented with police assistance on January 24, 2024.
The civil court later, through a judgment and decree dated May 8, 2024, directed that the petitioners should not be evicted except in accordance with due process of law.
The petitioners further alleged that on March 9 and 10, 2024, the respondent and her sons forcibly entered the shop, abused them and assaulted petitioner No. 2.
Following a complaint, FIR No. 0027/2024 was registered on March 10, 2024, under Sections 447, 441, 323 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
Neelam Gorkha subsequently approached the Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC, resulting in the June 3, 2024, direction to register an FIR against the petitioners.
Challenging the revisional court’s refusal to entertain their plea, Bharat Bhushan and Anuj Sajgotra argued before the High Court that the order had finally disposed of the application seeking police investigation and, therefore, could not automatically be classified as interlocutory.
In the connected matter, CRM(M) No. 678/2021, the petitioners were the then Senior Superintendent of Police, Jammu, Shridhar Patil, Deputy Superintendent of Police Parupkar Singh and Station House Officer, Janipur, Naresh Kumar. They had challenged proceedings arising from an order directing registration of an FIR on an application filed by Neha Chawla.
Their counsel argued that the direction had resulted in the registration of an FIR against senior police officials who had no role in recording the information or conducting the investigation.
It was further contended that the requisite statutory sanction and other legal safeguards had not been examined before directing investigation and that the order suffered from jurisdictional defects and non-application of judicial mind.
The petitioners argued that the revisional remedy was necessary to ensure that judicial directions were not issued mechanically or in disregard of mandatory statutory requirements.
The State and the respondents opposed the maintainability of the petitions, arguing that an order under Section 156(3) CrPC merely sets the police investigation in motion and does not determine the rights or criminal liability of the persons named in a complaint.
They relied upon the Allahabad High Court’s Full Bench judgment in Father Thomas v. State of Uttar Pradesh, maintaining that such orders were interlocutory and that revision petitions against them were barred under Section 397(2) CrPC.
The respondents also relied upon the Supreme Court judgments in Anurag Bhatnagar v. State (NCT of Delhi) and HDFC Securities Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, arguing that a person named in a complaint does not acquire a right to participate in proceedings merely because an investigation has been directed.
The High Court examined these rival submissions alongside the relevant judicial precedents.
It also considered the Full Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court in Arun P. Gidh v. Chandraprakash Singh, decided on April 10, 2024. However, Justice Parihar clarified that the Bombay High Court had not undertaken a fresh and conclusive determination of whether every order under Section 156(3) CrPC was revisable. It had recognised the existing line of Bombay High Court precedents permitting revision and discussed the consequences of interference at different stages of investigation and prosecution.
The Court also examined the Supreme Court’s judgment in Anurag Bhatnagar, decided on July 25, 2025, observing that although it reiterated the requirement of independent judicial application of mind by a Magistrate, it did not directly decide whether a criminal revision under Section 397 CrPC was maintainable against an order directing registration of an FIR.
Justice Parihar further noted that the Jammu and Kashmir High Court’s earlier ruling in Satpal Sharma was a precedent of a coordinate Bench and could not be overruled by another Bench of equal strength merely because a different interpretation appeared preferable.
“Judicial discipline and certainty in the administration of justice require adherence to the established principles governing precedents,” the Court observed.
It added that where substantial reasons existed to doubt the correctness of an earlier decision, the proper course was to refer the matter to a larger Bench for an authoritative determination.
The judgment also examined the implications of the BNSS, which came into force on July 1, 2024. It noted that Section 175(3) introduced additional procedural safeguards, including consideration of an application supported by an affidavit, such inquiry as the Magistrate considers necessary and submissions of the police officer concerned.
However, the Court clarified that these additional safeguards could not retrospectively govern the Magistrate’s order dated June 3, 2024, in the Bishnah case, which had been passed before the BNSS came into force.
Holding that the controversy involved a substantial question of law with implications beyond the two petitions, the Court formulated six questions for consideration by an appropriate larger Bench.
These include whether an order under Section 156(3) CrPC is necessarily interlocutory or can constitute an intermediate order amenable to revision; whether the final disposal of the application seeking investigation is relevant in determining its revisability; and whether the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Amar Nath, Madhu Limaye and Girish Kumar Suneja had been adequately considered in Satpal Sharma.
The larger Bench will also examine whether orders allegedly suffering from lack of jurisdiction, non-application of judicial mind or violation of mandatory statutory safeguards can be challenged through revision, or whether the aggrieved person must instead invoke the inherent or extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court.
Another question concerns the permissible scope of revisional interference at different stages, including before registration of an FIR, during investigation and after submission of a police report or taking of cognizance.
The Bench will also consider the impact of the additional safeguards under Section 175(3) BNSS on the character and revisability of such orders.
The Court concluded that an authoritative ruling was necessary to ensure consistency in the approach adopted by subordinate criminal courts.
Accordingly, it directed the Registry to place the records of both petitions before the Chief Justice for appropriate orders regarding the constitution of a larger Bench.
The judgment was reserved on November 2, 2026, and pronounced on November 17, 2026. Justice Sanjay Parihar authored the reportable judgment.












