Can India-Pakistan Conflict Bring Strategic Stability to South Asia?

   

by Ajay Darshan Behera

Follow Us OnG-News | Whatsapp

Whether India’s military action against Pakistan marks a turning point for regional stability or ushers in greater instability will depend not just on firepower, but on foresight and wisdom

Pakistan’s former Law and Information, who had come to condole Vajpayee’s death, in a meeting with Sushma Swaraj, India’s foreign minister

For decades, the spectre of nuclear war has shaped the India-Pakistan relationship, keeping conventional conflict carefully contained.

All this changed on May 7, 2025, when India took a step it had long resisted.

It launched a series of coordinated, high-precision strikes deep into Pakistani territory, targeting terrorist infrastructure at seven locations. The operation, codenamed “Operation Sindoor,” was not just another retaliatory mission; it was a clear, calculated and public signal of a new Indian military doctrine.

It crossed a strategic threshold, signalling that India will no longer be deterred by Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal when national security is at stake.

In doing so, India has effectively rewritten the rules of engagement in South Asia, with consequences that could be far-reaching and deeply troubling.

From strategic restraint to assertive deterrence

Since the nuclearisation of the subcontinent in 1998, both countries have operated under the assumption that “mutual assured destruction” would prevent war.

Yet, India alleges that Pakistan exploited this framework by supporting cross-border terrorism, calculating that India would avoid escalation for fear of nuclear retaliation. This was a brutal but effective strategy that allowed proxy attacks while denying state involvement.

Until recently, New Delhi adhered to those rules.

Even after the 2001 Parliament attack, the 2008 Mumbai massacre, and the 2016 Uri military base strike, India’s response remained limited to diplomatic pressure and carefully calibrated military actions, such as the 2016 “surgical strike” and the 2019 Balakot airstrike.

But with Operation Sindoor, the old playbook has been discarded.

Unlike its predecessors, this operation was broader in scope, employed advanced military technology, and relied on substantial airpower. Additionally, it was guided by India’s evolving “Cold Start” doctrine, which emphasises rapid, limited strikes designed to punish Pakistan without provoking full-scale war.

By targeting terrorist infrastructure while initially avoiding Pakistani military assets, India argued that it provided little justification for Pakistan to cross the nuclear threshold. Pakistan responded with attacks on India’s military installations and civilian targets. India’s response was more devastating, causing damage to eleven airbases and raising intense speculation that it might have struck nuclear weapon storage sites in the Kirana hills.

A familiar justification with a new twist

Interestingly, India’s argument mirrored Pakistan’s past behaviour.

Islamabad has repeatedly justified cross-border strikes into Afghanistan against Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) by citing Kabul’s failure to contain militants. India made the same case: when a state will not or cannot rein in terrorist actors, others will act in self-defence.

Pakistan, unsurprisingly, rejected the comparison.

It continues to label Kashmiri militants as freedom fighters and draws a clear line between them and jihadist groups like TTP. Yet this distinction has become increasingly untenable.

A dangerous new normal

The strategic implications of Operation Sindoor are profound.

India has publicly demonstrated that it believes limited military action can be conducted without triggering nuclear war. Pakistan’s deterrent strategy, which is based on the threat of early nuclear use, has suffered a setback.

If it cannot deter conventional retaliation, then its credibility as a nuclear power is called into question. Pakistani military planners may now feel compelled to lower their nuclear thresholds, forward-deploy tactical weapons, or escalate more rapidly in a future crisis—moves that increase risk.

Meanwhile, India is betting on a new model: deterrence through punishment.

By demonstrating its will and capability to impose costs for terrorist attacks, New Delhi aims to deter future provocations. However, this tit-for-tat logic cuts both ways. The space between peace and war is now filled with ambiguity.

Any future attack, whether real or alleged, could lead to immediate military escalation.

The ceasefire: Tactical pause, not strategic resolution

Three days after the operation, a ceasefire was brokered through military channels and international diplomatic pressure, as demonstrated in US President Donald Trump’s claims.

Both sides claimed victory. India declared that its objectives had been met, while Pakistan insisted it had forced India to back off.

This mutual posturing obscures a critical truth: the ceasefire is fragile and remains so.

While it did provide immediate relief, especially in border areas, it did little to resolve the underlying tensions. Neither side has altered its fundamental position. If anything, the operation has hardened attitudes and raised the stakes.

Strategic autonomy comes with a price

India’s new doctrine reflects a broader desire for strategic autonomy. New Delhi seeks the freedom to act without being constrained by global expectations of restraint.

But autonomy comes at a cost. The more India asserts itself militarily, the greater the risk of diplomatic backlash.

Global powers, such as the United States and Russia, along with friendly countries, are unlikely to remain passive if such confrontations become a recurring pattern. Repeated operations could also trap India in a cycle of escalation that is economically and politically unsustainable.

There are also internal risks. Crisis decision-making under a nuclear shadow is fraught with dangers. Maintaining escalation control demands not only military capability but also political judgment, disciplined communication, and a long-term strategic vision.

Propaganda, perception and political payoffs

In the aftermath, both governments reinforced their domestic narratives. India celebrated tactical victories and the targeting of high-value terrorist camps.

Pakistan emphasised civilian casualties and claimed its own military successes, including disputed reports of Indian aircraft being shot down.

Diplomatically, Pakistan has fared better. The country that matters the most, the US, has been more favourable toward Pakistan. President Donald Trump’s offer to mediate between India and Pakistan on the Kashmir issue suggests that he has not embraced India’s narrative on cross-border terrorism.

Did it succeed?

From a tactical standpoint, Operation Sindoor dealt a significant blow to several terrorist organisations. Infrastructure was destroyed, leadership was disrupted, and the message was clear: shelter in nuclear-armed Pakistan offers no protection.

Strategically, India has placed Pakistan-backed terrorism back on the international agenda. Forums such as the United Nations and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) have seen renewed calls for accountability, which gives India more leverage.

However, long-term effects remain uncertain. Terrorist groups adapt by rebranding, relocating, and evolving. Military operations, regardless of their precision, rarely yield permanent results. The true battle lies in dismantling the ideological and institutional machinery that supports terrorism, which requires more than missiles.

The road ahead: Force isn’t enough

Operation Sindoor demonstrated strength but also underscored its limits. Persistent military retaliation risks normalising conflict. It could spark arms races, disrupt economies, and inflame public sentiment. India must now pair its assertiveness with diplomatic finesse.

The breathing room created by Operation Sindoor should be used to push for deeper international pressure on Pakistan, demanding not only momentary crackdowns but also structural change.

Operation Sindoor was a strategic shockwave. It challenged long-held assumptions, redrew red lines, and redefined deterrence in South Asia. However, it has also opened a dangerous new chapter, one in which “limited war” is thinkable and nuclear deterrence is less certain. We exist in a state of no war, no peace.

(Written by Ajay Darshan Behera, a Professor at MMAJ Academy of International Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi. Originally published under Creative Commons by 360info.)

LEAVE A REPLY

Please enter your comment!
Please enter your name here