STPs in any manner whatsoever. It is for the reason that this is absolutely essential for maintaining proper sewage system and cleanliness in the areas where large number of persons come and stay overnight or even for a longer period. It was commonly conceded before us that the Shrine Board would provide fabricated toilets and if necessary
even the pre-fabricated pathway at and around the Holy Shrine.
21. In its report, the SHPC at para 7.18 has noticed that quality of tents existing at various camps and sites needs improvement. The existing tents were found deficient in all respects. One of the applicants before this Court, M/s. Piramal Healthcare Pvt. Ltd. (In I.A. No. 4 of 2012), had volunteered to provide any help at a large scale that may be required by the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the Board to facilitate the travel, living and darshan of the pilgrims. It was offered that they could provide even pre-fabricated tents and toilets which will help and provide convenience not only to the pilgrims but even to all the persons, including the officials on duty. We find this request to be reasonable and, therefore, give liberty to them to approach the Shrine Board with a request to provide such pre-fabricated material at large scale. We are hopeful that the Board would consider the request sympathetically and objectively.
22. All these matters require greater attention of all the stakeholders and they need to make their plans well in advance and to fully equip themselves to meet any challenge. Thus, we are of the opinion that the process afore-indicated and as stated in the report, be completed in a timely and expeditious manner.
24. The next question that arises is as to what directions generally and particularly in the cases of the present kind, the Court is competent to issue.
25. In the case of M.C. Mehta v. Union of India [(1987) 1 SCC 395], the Court, while discussing the ambit and scope of Article 32 of the Constitution, held as under :
“We have already had occasion to consider the ambit and coverage of Article 32 in the Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India and we wholly endorse what has been stated by one of us namely, Bhagwati, J. as he then was in his judgment in that case in regard to the true scope and ambit of that article. It may now be taken as well settled that Article 32 does not merely confer
power on this Court to issue a direction, order or writ for enforcement of the fundamental rights but it also lays a constitutional obligation on this Court to protect the fundamental rights of the people and for that purpose this Court has all incidental and ancillary powers including the power to
forge new remedies and fashion new strategies designed to enforce the fundamental rights. It is in realisation of this constitutional obligation that this Court has in the past innovated new methods and strategies for the purpose of securing enforcement of the fundamental rights, particularly in the case of the poor and the disadvantaged who are denied their basic human rights and to whom freedom and liberty have no meaning.
We are also of the view that this Court under Article 32(1) is free to devise any procedure appropriate for the particular purpose of the proceeding, namely, enforcement of a fundamental right and under Article 32(2) the court has the implicit power to issue whatever direction, order or writ is necessary in a
given case, including all incidental or ancillary power necessary to secure enforcement of the fundamental right. The power of the court is not only injunctive in ambit, that is, preventing the infringement of a fundamental right, but it is also remedial in scope and provides relief against a breach of
the fundamental right already committed vide Bandhua Mukti Morcha case. If the court were powerless to issue any direction, order or writ in cases where a fundamental right has already been violated, Article 32 would be robbed of all its efficacy, because then the situation would be that if a fundamental right
is threatened to be violated, the court can inject such violation but if the violator is quick enough to take action infringing the fundamental right, he would escape from the net of Article 32. That would, to a large extent, emasculate the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 32 and render it
impotent and futile. We must, therefore, hold that Article 32 is not powerless to assist a person when he finds that his fundamental right has been violated. He can in that event seek remedial assistance under Article 32. The power of the court to grant such remedial relief may include the power to award compensation in appropriate cases. We are deliberately using the
words “in appropriate cases” because we must make it clear that it is not in every case where there is a breach of a fundamental right committed by the violator that compensation would be awarded by the court in a petition under Article 32.”
26. In the case of Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan [(1997) 6 SCC 241, this Court held as under :
“Each such incident results in violation of the fundamental rights of “Gender Equality” and the “Right to Life and Liberty”.
It is a clear violation of the rights under Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution. One of the logical consequences of such an incident is also the violation of the victim’s fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) “to practise any profession or to carry out any occupation, trade or business”. Such violations, therefore, attract the remedy under Article 32 for the
enforcement of these fundamental rights of women. This class action under Article 32 of the Constitution is for this reason.
A writ of mandamus in such a situation, if it is to be effective, needs to be accompanied by directions for prevention, as the violation of fundamental rights of this kind is a recurring phenomenon. The fundamental right to carry on any occupation, trade or profession depends on the availability of a
“safe” working environment. Right to life means life with dignity. The primary responsibility for ensuring such safety and dignity through suitable legislation, and the creation of a mechanism for its enforcement, is of the legislature and the executive. When, however, instances of sexual harassment resulting in violation of fundamental rights of women workers under Articles 14, 19 and 21 are brought before us for redress under Article 32, an effective redressal requires that some guidelines should be laid down for the protection of these rights to fill the legislative vacuum.
15. In Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa a provision in the ICCPR was referred to support the view taken that “an enforceable right to compensation is not alien to the concept of enforcement of a guaranteed right”, as a public law remedy under Article 32, distinct from the private law remedy in torts. There is no reason why these international conventions and norms
cannot, therefore, be used for construing the fundamental rights expressly guaranteed in the Constitution of India which embody the basic concept of gender equality in all spheres of human activity.
16. In view of the above, and the absence of enacted law to provide for the effective enforcement of the basic human right of gender equality and guarantee against sexual harassment and abuse, more particularly against sexual harassment at workplaces, we lay down the guidelines and norms specified hereinafter for due observance at all workplaces or other
institutions, until a legislation is enacted for the purpose.
This is done in exercise of the power available under Article 32 of the Constitution for enforcement of the fundamental rights and it is further emphasised that this would be treated as the law declared by this Court under Article 141 of the Constitution.”
27. In the case of Vineet Narain v. Union of India [(1998) 1 SCC 226], the Court held as under:-
“There are ample powers conferred by Article 32 read with Article 142 to make orders which have the effect of law by virtue of Article 141 and there is mandate to all authorities to act in aid of the orders of this Court as provided in Article 144 of the Constitution. In a catena of decisions of this Court, this power has been recognised and exercised, if need be, by issuing necessary directions to fill the vacuum till such time the legislature steps in to cover the gap or the executive discharges its role. It is in the discharge of this duty that the IRC was constituted by the Government of India with a view to obtain its recommendations after an in-depth study of the problem in order to
