by Mudasir Khan
The judgments by the Supreme Court and the Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh High Court contribute to broadening the scope and reach of anti-graft legislation, aiming to eliminate corruption across all facets of public administration.
In Justice NV Ramana’s words, corruption is a malignant manifestation of a moral malady afflicting humanity.
India formally embraced the global fight against corruption by ratifying the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC) in 2011. Preceding this ratification, the country already had anti-corruption legislation in place, known as the Prevention of Corruption Act, of 1988 (amended in 2018). This legislative framework, enacted before international commitments, sought to broaden the definition of “public servant” to align with global standards and combat corruption within the public sector.
Section 2(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act furnishes a comprehensive characterisation of a “public servant,” delineating the term in clauses (i-xii).
Notably, Section 2(c)(viii) of the Act extends the definition to encompass “any person who holds an office by which he is authorised or required to perform any public duty.” The term “public duty” itself
is explicitly defined in Section 2(b) of the Act as a duty discharged in the interest of the State, the public, or the community at large.
In the case of ‘State of MP v/s Ram Singh’, as documented in (2000) 5 SCC 88, the Supreme Court emphasised the need for a purposive approach in interpreting the definition of “public servant” under clause (c) of Section 2 of the 1988 Act. The court asserted that a comprehensive understanding of the term, in alignment with the legislature’s intent, is crucial.
The Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying the bill leading to the Act’s passage was deemed instructive in understanding the legislative background. The court acknowledged that the Act, with its expansive definition of “public servant,” was enacted to cleanse public administration and combat the escalating corruption within government and semi-government entities. The court, therefore, advocated for a broad interpretation of the definition, in line with the statute’s overarching objective.
In the case of ‘Subramanian Swamy v/s Manmohan Singh’, detailed in (2012) 3 SCC 64, the apex court issued a profound observation. It asserted that corruption in India not only poses a serious threat to constitutional governance but also jeopardizes the very foundation of Indian democracy and the Rule of Law. The court highlighted the incompatibility of widespread corruption with the principles of a socialist, secular democratic republic.
Stressing the integral connection between corruption and the erosion of human rights, development, and justice, the court underscored that the judiciary must interpret and implement anti-corruption laws in a manner that strengthens the fight against corruption. The court emphasised that, when faced with two reasonable interpretations, the one aimed at eradicating corruption should be favoured over the alternative perpetuating it.
In a notable judgment (2016) 3 SCC 788, Central Bureau of Investigation v/s Ramesh Gelli (& Others), the apex court underscored the legislative intent behind the Prevention of Corruption Act (PC Act). It emphasised the necessity of interpreting the law to fulfil its intended purpose, particularly concerning Section 46A of the Banking Regulation Act (BR Act).
The court asserted that any judicial reluctance to address the omission in Section 46A, which pertains to the offences under Sections 7 to 12 of the PC Act, would contradict the overarching objective of widening the definition of “public servant” under the PC Act. The court affirmed the need for a judicious approach to rectify inadvertent omissions and ensure the effective implementation of the legislative intent.
In another significant ruling on April 27, 2020, in the case of State of Gujarat v/s Mansukhbhai Kanjibhai Shah, Criminal Appeal No 989 of 2018, the Supreme Court delved into the interpretation of the term ‘public servant.’ Stressing the relevance of ‘public duty’ as outlined in Section 2(b) of the PC Act, the court noted that any duty carrying an interest for the State, the public, or the community at large falls within the ambit of a public duty.
In its interpretation, the apex court elucidated that the designation of an individual as a “public servant” under the PC Act hinges on the nature of the public duty performed rather than the person’s official position. The court extended the scope by acknowledging that anyone de facto discharging public servant functions should not escape liability due to legal technicalities.
The court, in various cases, consistently emphasized that once the nature of duty performance aligns with Section 2(c), clarity emerges regarding who falls under the PC Act’s purview.
Furthermore, the court underscored the significance of examining whether an individual holds office under an authority considered ‘State’ under Article 12 of the Constitution of India when determining their classification as a ‘Public Servant.’ This aspect complements the contextual understanding of the definition of ‘Public Servant’ within the PC Act.
The issue recently re-emerged before the High Court of Jammu Kashmir and Ladakh, prompting a review in the case another through Senior Superintendent of Police, Police Station Anti–Corruption Bureau Srinagar (CRM(M) No 464/2023 CrlM No 1105/202).
The petitioners sought the quashing of FIR No 16/2023, dated August 18, 2023, registered against them in the Anti-corruption Bureau Srinagar under Sections 7 and 7A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. They contended that the FIR exceeded jurisdiction and amounted to an abuse of legal process.
The pivotal questions addressed in the petition were: (a) Whether the petitioners fall within the definition of ‘public servant’ as outlined in Section 2(c) of the Act and if they are engaged in ‘public duty’ as per Section 2(b) of the definition clause of the Act. (b) Considering the allegations at face value, whether the essential elements of Sections 7 and 7A have been established, justifying proceedings against the petitioners under the Prevention of Corruption Act.
The court, in rejecting the petition, determined that both petitioners squarely fall within the defined scope of ‘public servant’ as outlined in Section 2(c) of the act. The court emphasised the legislative intent behind introducing a comprehensive definition of ‘public servant’ aimed at combatting and penalising the escalating corruption in society associated with public duties. It cautioned against constraining the definition in a manner contrary to the statute’s spirit.
Further clarification from the court highlighted, “A person holding office, authorised or required to perform any public duty, and individuals employed by institutions receiving financial assistance from the Central government, State government, or local public authorities, unequivocally qualify as ‘public servants’ under the Prevention of Corruption Act.” The court clarified that public servants need not exclusively be government or civil servants, while all government or civil servants inherently fall within the ‘public servant’ category.
The High Court, extending the reach of the Prevention of Corruption (PC) Act, affirmed that offences under this legislation could be invoked not solely against public servants but also against individuals discharging “public duty” by their office.
Justice Nargal underscored the imperative to combat corruption, emphasising a zero-tolerance approach. The court asserted that reducing monopolies and fostering transparency in decision-making processes strategically diminish corruption. However, it stressed that fortifying the social and moral fabric must be integral to long-term nation-building policies to achieve a corruption-free society.
The court addressed the primary issue before it, whether the conditions of Sections 7 and 7A were met in this case to proceed under the PC Act. The ruling affirmed that even if an individual is not a public servant per se, discharging a public duty by their office brings them within the ambit of the PC Act.
In a Special Leave Petition (SLP) challenging the High Court’s judgment, the Supreme Court upheld the verdict without finding any grounds for interference. The division bench, comprising Justice Aniruddha Bose and Justice Bela M Trivedi, dismissed the SLP, affirming the J&K High Court’s decision.
The judgments contribute to broadening the scope and reach of anti-graft legislation, aiming to eliminate corruption across all facets of public administration. The principles established by these rulings, both from the apex court and the High Court, reflect a judicial commitment to align with the spirit and purpose of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Importantly, these decisions demonstrate the judiciary’s resolve not to allow inadvertent legislative oversights to hinder a comprehensive interpretation of the term “Public Servant” under the Prevention of Corruption Act.
(The author is a law graduate from the University of Kashmir. Currently serving as a Law Officer in the Department of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Jammu and Kashmir. Ideas are personal)
