A US intelligence analysis group Stratfor has pooh-poohed the accusations of links between Kashmiri separatists and Maoist of central and eastern India leveled by some Indian police officials and political parties. Iftikhar Gilani reports.
After noted writer Arundhati Roy at a seminar attended by hardline Hurriyat leader Syed Ali Geelani in Delhi called for an “alliance of oppressed”, Indian government agencies have been sniffing an ISI-backed plot between Kashmiri separatists and Naxalites in central and eastern India. Backing this impression, the Director General of Chhatisgarh Police, Vishwa Ranjan last week mentioned a meeting between Naxalites and Pakistan-based militant outfit Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT). He said two LeT operatives had attended a Naxalite meeting in April or May, calling it a new policy and planning for increasing “armed resistance”.
Even Chief Minister Omar Abdullah recently joined the BJP raising hackles about Maoist links with Kashmir. The opposition BJP also claimed that “startling revelations” had come to light about links among Pakistan’s ISI (Inter Services Intelligence), Kashmiri separatists and Naxals.
“Startling revelations have come out in the public domain on the connections between ISI, Hurriyat and the Naxals. It had been suspected for a long time,” BJP spokesperson, Nirmala Sitharaman said.
However, a global team of US intelligence professionals have decried any such alliance, saying it found no evidence of any link between Maoists known as Naxalites and Pakistan based jihadi groups or its intelligence agency ISI.
Media has been agog with stories quoting official sources that ISI was desperately trying to make inroads into the Naxal ranks and had now started seeking support of Kashmiri separatists and their sympathizers in this regard. They claimed having found evidence of some Naxal activities in R S Pura in 2007 and later in 2008, Naxal support base was found in the Jammu University.
They also believed that the Naxal over-ground supporters have been visiting Kashmir Valley and Jammu regions over past few years, referring to a shutdown call on September 29 by Naxalites in support of the secession of Kashmir from India.
Dismissing these reports, the US agency has described such visions alarmist and not reflecting the true nature of the situation. US-based intelligence group STRATFOR after investigating the source of Naxalite weaponry and training concluded that the rebels appear to remain a very self-reliant group, who have not established a strong partnership with Pakistan when it comes to weapons and training.
Even before Ranjan’s open accusations, home ministry officials had been implicating jihadi groups and Kashmiri separatists for tying up with Naxalites, referring to increasing attacks in the central and eastern rural India.
“STRATFOR has watched Pakistan’s links with Naxalites, before, but we have yet to see significant changes on the ground that would give any credence to the scenario… Many Indian officials are equally insistent that no connections exist between Naxalites and Pakistan.
Although Naxalites have provided rhetorical support for Kashmiri (and other anti-India groups) opposition to New Delhi over the past year, there has been little action to back up the rhetoric,” said intelligence analyst Ben West.
While examining the weaponry of Naxalites, West concludes, though there was evidence of some Pakistani involvement in supplying the weapons, but he hastily added, it was through third parties. He believed that Maoists have obtained arsenal from four different sources – from Indian security forces, theft from businesses, local arms factories and procuring from external militant and criminal groups.
The group has even found NATO ammunition; variants of the AK-47 that fire 7.62mm rounds; and even Israeli-made sniper rifles like the Galil 7.62mm from Naxaites. Over a period of six months, the report says, one zone command spends more than three-quarters of the unit’s budget on weapons ($70,214), with the rest ($20,604) spent on supplies. Such evidence suggests that Naxalite weapon procurements from the outside have their limitations; obtaining them locally is far cheaper and can be done easily.
Further, the Naxalite arsenal is vast and diverse, consisting of weapons manufactured in China, Russia, the United States, Pakistan and India. The lack of weapons uniformity among Naxalite groups indicates that they do not have a benefactor that has bestowed on them a reliable, standardized arsenal and have had to build their own from scratch.
Quoting its sources in India, STRATFOR report claims that Pakistani intelligence has established business relationships with Naxalites to sell arms and ammunition and lately has tried to use Naxal bases for anti-Indian activities. There is evidence that the ISI is providing weapons and ammunition to the Naxalites in exchange for money or services, mostly through third parties like the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) or the ostensible Bangladeshi militant leader Shailen Sarkar. Indian army sources, however, told the US group that they are investigating but still lack the evidence to prove a direct link between the Naxalites and the ISI, since the Pakistanis continue to play a peripheral role.
The group has, however, found Naxalite links with other militant groups – ULFA, the People’s Liberation Army of Manipur (PLAM), the National Social Council of Nagaland-Issac Muviah (NSCN-IM), LTTE, Nepalese Maoists comprise the militant wing of the Unified Communist Party of Nepal and Shailen Sarkar a member of the Communist Party of Bangladesh. Home Ministry accuses Sarkar’s group of training Naxalites at ISI-funded camps in Bangladesh. The ministry also claims that Sarkar has met with Naxal leaders in India.
Admitting that evidence of direct links between the ISI and the Naxalites was hard to come by, the report believed that murky, circuitous relationships were most likely preferred in the tense diplomatically environment.
Further, the American report said Naxalites are a low-maintenance, self-sustaining movement that will continue to undermine Indian rule. Pakistan does not need to expend more resources to sustain this, and the Naxalites are likely wary of undermining their own local legitimacy by accepting too much assistance from an outside government. “While something like a standardized arsenal compliments of the ISI would benefit the Naxalites operationally, such a move would be a high-risk, low-reward effort for Islamabad, which seeks to operate very subtly in India for the time being while tensions over the 2008 Mumbai attacks continue to cool off,” it added.
