In 15 years of its deployment in Kashmir, BSF had emerged as the main battle force against insurgents. Using impunity from law and all the methods one could visualize, the BSF, by its own admissions in September 2005, had killed 2653 militants – of them 1016 foreigners and 38 top commanders, besides detaining 9735, recovering 10701 weapons and making 928 militants to surrender. At one point of time, Srinagar was literally ruled by the BSF. Its ruthless counter-insurgency fetched it a dedicated chain of informers and spotters who evolved their strategy with a fugitive’s mind. But the achievement cost it 697 ranks and another 3733 survived with injuries. At the time of its de-induction, the BSF had 34 battalions deployed in Srinagar but its prized possession was the G-branch, its intelligence wing that was the fountainhead of its successful operations.

Though the de-induction that started in 2003 was supposed to be complete by October 2004, it could not happen because most of the installations that were manned by CRPF witnessed a series of Fidayeen attacks. Authorities halted the process and also started training the CRPF for the new assignment. Over 5,000 CRPF men who replaced the BSF in September 2005 were actually trained in Srinagar for over two months. The transition, grudgingly accepted by the BSF completed early 2007. Now over 430 companies are deployed in Kashmir Valley, of them 217 in Srinagar city alone. The force has even accommodated as many as 609 surrendered militants.

But it proved a bagful of surprises. The CRPF that replaced BSF was basically trained to fight militants alongside the state police’s SOG. As the graph of militancy nosedived, most of the para-military men were busy guarding their own garrisons, protecting vital installations and raising drop-gates. It was the agitation of 2008 summer that identified the grey areas in the CRPF’s training.

Admits a senior police officer: “When the CRPF was deployed in 1990 they knew how to tackle routine law and order situations. So they would go berserk on every small issue”. Later when they were re-inducted, they were trained to fight militants but the situation demanded plain policing to take care of crowds. They over-reacted in most of the cases and led to as many as 58 deaths. The officer said CRPF alone is not to be blamed. “For the last two decades, tackling militancy is the top of the priority for the government. So irrespective of who was deployed on ground, the brief and the training is to kill.” He said last three batches of the Kashmir Police Service recruits know more about neutralizing militants than crowd management. So the crisis remains.

When Omar Abdullah talked about “substituting” CRPF by state police, it was nothing new. It is a very old plan that once the security situation improves, the law and order – otherwise a state subject, will be handed over completely to the state police. The problem arose as the issue was neither handled well nor pushed properly. This has created problems for all the stake-holders from Delhi to Srinagar. In fact, CRPF super cops in the state felt so humiliated, or pretended so, that they sent a letter to the Government of India. It is now public knowledge that IG CRPF N C Asthana, in his three-page letter to his headquarters said his force is demoralized as the state police is non cooperative in handling the situation. Suggesting the police be asked to be in the forefront of dealing with the mobs, Asthana had said they are being attacked by boiling water, hot rice water (starch) and Molotov cocktail (petrol bomb).

State government has reacted adequately. Apart from asking the officer to raise the issue in the Unified Headquarters – an extra-constitutional body with all the security agencies as members, the state government has cited instances in which the CRPF personnel have ran amuck over smaller issues. In the Unified Headquarters an additional DG represents the CRPF.

After detailed interactions between Prime Minster and Chief Minister, the issue is apparently settled, at least for the time being. The two sides have taken refuge under numbers. Omar has categorically said that unless the state has adequate numbers, it can not replace CRPF. State government is thinking in terms of giving the VVIP security to CRPF that will fetch around 7500 cops. But no decision is taken yet.

Police officials say the best way out is to start a phased process. “A gradual process should be started of de-notifying areas as disturbed and pulling out excess security men, irrespective of the fact whether they are from army, CRPF or the police’s many smaller forces that lack proper wages, roles and accountability,” an official told Kashmir Life. Police has strength of 81370 excluding over 25000 SPOs and VDC members.

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